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Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.1 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Trans individuals in both the United States and in the 
United Kingdom have had to take the road less traveled by, in their 
private lives and in their employment relationships and it has made 
all the difference.  Horrific consequences have resulted for many 
of those whose gender identity differs from their birth-assigned 
gender with hate crimes, violence and murder being the most grim 
consequences. “Transgender and gender non-conforming people 
face rampant discrimination in every area of life: education, 
employment, family life, public accommodations, housing, health, 
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 PhD., Senior Lecturer, University of Bradford School of Law, Bradford, UK,  
j.guth@bradford.ac.uk 
1 ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, MOUNTAIN INTERVAL (1920). 
ATLANTIC LAW JOURNAL VOLUME 17 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
police and jails, and ID documents.”2 While we acknowledge that 
all these issues are urgently in need of attention and awareness 
raising, the focus of this paper is on the protection of trans 
individuals in the employment sphere in two jurisdictions which 
vary significantly in their approach. We argue that the protection 
available under the Equality Act 2010 provides some hope for 
trans individuals in the UK but that much depends on judicial 
interpretation. Concepts such as gender stereoptyping which could 
be ‘borrowed’ from the US context could help interpret and 
develop the law so as to promote equality and protections from 
discrimination. We further argue that the US has further to travel 
along the road to equality and that it can learn from the explicit 
protection afforded to trans individuals in statute. We begin with a 
brief consideration of the context in which we are writing and an 
explanation of the vocabulary used before considering each 
jurisdiction in turn. Toward the end of the paper we seek to 
highlight what the jurisdictions can learn from each other. 
 
  
A.  Legal Recognition of Gender Identity 
 
 Since April 4, 2005 it has been possible in the UK to apply 
for a Gender Recognition Certificate3 that is available for those 
who have suffered from gender dysphoria, have lived as their 
acquired gender for at least two years and intend to do so 
permanently.4 Statistics on the number of Gender Recognition 
                                                 
2 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Injustice at Every Turn:  A Report of 
the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/ntds. 
3 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c.17 (U.K.) 
4 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c.17 (U.K.) (§ 1. A Gender Recognition 
Certificate allows the holder to live legally as their acquired gender. In other 
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Certificates issued gives us a glimpse into the community with 
which this paper is concerned. Statistics are readily available 
showing the number of certificates applied for since inception. A 
total of 4111 Gender Recognition Certificates have been applied 
for between April 2005 and the end of March 2014.5  Reports have 
been published quarterly since 2009 and show a fairly steady 
stream of around 75 applications a quarter.6 These figures of 
course give us only the briefest of insights as they refer only to 
people who have taken the step to formally change their gender; 
they do not take account of the many transgendered people who 
have chosen not to apply for a certificate for whatever reason or of 
those whose gender identity is far more fluid such as those 
identifying as any other part of the trans community. Here 
estimates vary greatly between 65000 people7 to 300000 people8 
identifying as trans in the UK.    
 In the US transgender persons struggling to have their self-
identified gender legally recognized find that amending their birth 
certificates is fundamentally necessary in order to ensure legal 
                                                                                                             
words once the Certificate has been obtained, the holder is legally (as well as in 
their own life generally) considered to be the acquired gender, not the sex 
assigned at birth). 
5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE Quarterly Official Statistics on Gender Recognition 
Certificates applied for and granted by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals 
Service’s Gender Recognition Panel, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/gender-recognition-certificate-
statistics (last visited  on May 27, 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS Trans Data Position Paper. (OPSI 
2009). 
8 GIRES Gender Dysphoria, Transsexualism and Transgenderism: Incidence, 
Prevalence and Growth in the UK and the Implications for the Commissioners 
and Providers of Healthcare, available at 
http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/GIRES-Prevalence-Abstract-2.pdf (last visited on 
May 27, 2014). 
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congruity with their gender identity. Since there are no federal 
laws their difficulties vary from state to state.  In many instances 
birth certificates will only be changed upon production of proof of 
sex reassignment surgery (SRO).  However, most transgender 
persons do not undergo SRO.  Questions still remain as to whether 
trans people are required to have surgery for their sexual identities 
to be recognized for various legal transactions, such as 
marriage.  For instance, transgender people in Montana face the 
situation where they could be legally recognized as one sex for 
some purposes and another sex for others.  Montana permits 
transgender persons to legally change drivers' license sex 
designations even if surgery has not been performed; on the other 
hand, Montana only permits postoperative transgender persons to 
legally change birth-assigned sex on birth certificates.9 
 
B.  Employment Discrimination 
 
 In the United Kingdom it is clear is that discrimination in 
employment is of significant concern.  A relatively recent 
government survey found that most trans employees were 
concerned about employment issues; very few felt their gender 
identity was safe from disclosure and at least half had been the 
victim of discrimination in the workplace.10 
      In the United States few people will be surprised to learn that 
“in this day and age [transgender] individuals still face intense, 
                                                 
9 Wesley Parks, Removal of the Impediment:  The State of Transgender 
Marriage in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 309, 310 (2013). 
10 GOVERNMENT EQUALITIES OFFICE Headline Findings from our 
transgender online surveys, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/headline-findings-from-our-
transgender-online-survey (last visited May 27, 2014). 
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pervasive discrimination in the employment context, the statistics 
are still nothing short of astounding.”11  
A recent national survey of almost 6,500 
transgender individuals found that nearly half of 
respondents had experienced an adverse 
employment action--denial of a job, denial of a 
promotion, or termination of employment--as a 
result of their transgender status and/or gender 
nonconformity. Fifty percent reported harassment 
by someone at work, forty-five percent stated that 
co-workers had referred to them using incorrect 
gender pronouns “repeatedly and on purpose,” and 
fifty-seven percent confessed that they delayed their 
gender transition in order to avoid discriminatory 
actions and workplace abuse. It is little wonder that 
many in the transgender community feel that they 
have no choice but to suffer through this type of 
hostility, as transgender employees who lose their 
job due to workplace bias are six times as likely as 
the general United States population to be living on 
a household income under $10,000 per year, and 
four times as likely to have experienced 
homelessness as transgender individuals who did 
not lose a job due to workplace bias.12 (Citations 
omitted.) 
                                                 
11 Jason Lee, Comment, Lost in Transition:  The Challenges of Remedying 
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 423, 424 (2012). 
12 Id. at 424-425, (citing Jaime M. Grant, et al, Nat'l Ctr. for Transgender Equal. 
and Nat'l Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the 
National Transgender Discrimination Survey 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/ntds). 
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 These findings suggest that a better understanding of 
transgender discrimination in employment is vital if we are to 
move forward towards equality. To help us do that, this paper 
considers both the US condition and the situation in the UK in 
order to see what, if anything, we can learn from each other. 
 
 
II. THE VOCABULARY OF GENDER IDENTITY 
 
Biology loves variation. Biology loves differences. 
Society hates it.13 
 
 In order to understand the law surrounding gender identity, 
it is important to understand the meaning of transgender (or trans).   
Traditionally it has been a comprehensive term “encompassing 
anyone who is at odds with traditional concepts of gender, whether 
transsexual, transvestite, intersexed, or otherwise.”
14
  More 
recently, outside the courtroom, it is sometimes being replaced by 
the term genderqueer.  “Genderqueer (GQ; alternatively non-
binary) is a catch-all category for gender identities other than man 
and woman, thus outside of the gender binary and 
cisnormativity.”15  Genderqueer people may identify as one or 
more of the following: 
                                                 
13 Dr. Milton Diamond, quoted at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/27/trans-murder-
rates_n_3824273.html#slide=875171. 
14 Neil Dishman, The Expanding Rights of Transsexuals in the Workplace, 21 
LAB. LAW 121, 123-24 (Fall 2005) (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, 
DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576 
(4th ed., text revision 2000)). 
15 USHER, RAVEN, ED. NORTH AMERICAN LEXICON OF TRANSGENDER TERMS 
(2006). 
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 having an overlap of, or indefinite lines between, gender 
identity and sexual and romantic orientation.16  
 two or more genders (bigender, trigender, pangender); 
 without a gender (nongendered, genderless, agender; 
neutrois); 
 moving between genders or with a fluctuating gender 
identity (genderfluid);17  
 third gender or other-gendered; includes those who do not 
place a name to their gender;18 
 
 Transsexuals are individuals who have been diagnosed with 
a recognized medical condition called gender identity disorder or 
gender dysphoria.
19
 According to the American Psychiatric 
Association, transsexualism is characterized as a disjunction 
between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity.
20
   
Individuals who change their birth-assigned gender may be male to 
female (MTF) or female to male (FTM). 
 
Gender identity disorder is marked by two 
characteristics:  
(1) a strong and persistent cross-gender 
identification, which is the desire to be, or the 
insistence that one is, of the other sex; and  
                                                 
16 BRILL, STEPHANIE A. & RACHEL PEPPER, THE TRANSGENDER CHILD: A 
HANDBOOK FOR FAMILIES AND PROFESSIONALS (2008). 
17 WINTER, CLAIRE RUTH UNDERSTANDING TRANSGENDER DIVERSITY: A 
SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF SEXUAL AND GENDER IDENTITIES (2010). 
18 BEEMYN, BRETT GENNY , AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, 
TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER CULTURE (2008). 
19 Id. 
20 American Psychiatric Association. American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 576-582 (4th ed.2000). 
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(2) persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or 
a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of 
that sex.”
21
   
 
 Last, a transvestite is more commonly thought of as a 
cross-dresser (a heterosexual person who dresses as the opposite 
sex); an intersexed person is someone who has ambiguous 
genitalia and/or chromosomes (a physical, not psychological, 
condition).
22
   
 
III. The Current Situation in the US 
 
 Regarding legislative protection of trans individual from 
employment discrimination, the current situation in the US can 
best be described as complex and uncertain.  In thirty-three states 
there is no state law protecting transgender people from being fired 
for being who they are.23 Only seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia currently prohibit discrimination based on gender 
identity;24  this current patchwork of state-level protections for 
trans people is insufficient.   
 Forty years ago, "Battling Bella" Abzug, a member of 
Congress from New York and a trailblazer for women, introduced 
a bill to protect gay people from discrimination for the first time in 
                                                 
21 Dishman, supra, note 14 at 123. 
22 Erika Birch & Rachel Otto, Is Legislation Necessary to Protect the Rights of 
Transgendered Employees? 51 ADVOC 24 (2008). 
23Transgender Law Center, LGBT Policy Tally Snapshot, 
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/equalitymap (last visited July 30, 2115.  
24 Id. (CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, IA, MA, ME, MN, NJ, NM, NV, OR, RI, VT 
and WA have protective legislation). 
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American history.25 The Equality Act of 1974 would have banned 
discrimination against lesbians, gay men, unmarried persons, and 
women in employment, housing, and public accommodations.  It 
didn’t specifically mention trans individuals, nor did it become 
law.  Four decades later, the only good news is that this year there 
were over 200 co-sponsors on the current bill, Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).26  Because the Act has never been 
passed trans people can be denied employment or fired because of 
their gender identity in thirty-three states.  Although an 
overwhelming majority of the American public support legislative 
action to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity, Congress has not acted.27    
 In addition, Congress and most of the federal courts have 
repeatedly failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity 
as explicitly protected categories under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.
28
  In deference to Congress, even the most progressive 
                                                 
25 Ian S. Thompson, The 40th Anniversary of an LGBT Milestone in Congress, 
ACLU, available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup (last visited 
May 30, 2014.) 
26 Id. See also Alex Reed, A Pro-Trans Argument for a Transexclusive 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM BUS. L.J. 835 (2013) (For an in-
depth discussion of ENDA). 
27 Id. (A 2011 poll found that 73 percent of likely voters support protecting 
LGBT people from discrimination in employment). 
28 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2000).  (This subsection, which applies to employers 
who have at least fifteen employees and are involved in interstate commerce, 
provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
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of courts have therefore only granted relief to bi/homosexual 
plaintiffs who focus on their nonsexual  gender-nonconformity--
such as their manner of speech or dress--rather than on their 
bi/homosexuality itself.  
 However, twenty years ago, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
29
 determined that under 
Title VII  
 [i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended 
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.
30
 
 
 The Court created a “diverging road” when it held 
that employment discrimination based on gender 
stereotyping was illegal discrimination because of sex; 
however, this diverging road is the “one less traveled by, 
[a]nd that has made all the difference.”
31
   In discrimination 
suits based on transgendered status, gender stereotyping has 
seldom been raised as an issue.  When plaintiffs have 
attempted to prove they were discriminated against because 
                                                                                                             
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
The Act was not originally intended to include any provision regarding gender 
protection; “sex” was added to the list of protected classes in a last-minute 
attempt to sabotage the bill, but despite the fear that its passage would result in 
equal employment rights for women, the bill passed). 
29 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
30 490 U.S. 228 at 251 ((citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978)) (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).  
31 FROST, supra note 1. 
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of their gender nonconforming appearance, behavior, and 
personal habits, very few have been successful in their 
reliance on the theory of gender stereotyping.  The federal 
judiciary generally has been unwilling to go down the less 
traveled road and it has made all the difference.   
 To analyze this judicial reluctance to allow 
plaintiffs’ recovery based on gender stereotyping, this 
section of the paper first explores the issues of gender 
stereotyping as presented by the Price Waterhouse Court,
32
 
and then examines the relevant Title VII jurisprudence.   
 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
 
 For many years Congress and the judiciary have recognized 
“the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices,”
33
 but it 
wasn’t until 1989 that the Supreme Court specifically clarified the 
illegality of gender stereotyping.
34
  Although the partners at Price 
Waterhouse recognized Ann Hopkins as an “outstanding 
professional” with a “strong character, independence and 
integrity,”
35
  they denied her a partnership because she was not 
feminine enough.  Clearly engaging in gender stereotyping, they 
criticized her as being “brusque” and “harsh,”
36
 “a lady using foul 
language.”
37
  Reacting negatively to her personality, partners 
comment that she was "macho," "overcompensated for being a 
woman," needed to take "a course at charm school," and should 
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
                                                 
32 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
33 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
34 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237. 
35 Id. at 233-34. 
36 Id. at 234-35. 
37 Id. at 235. 
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femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry."
38
  The masculine characteristics that had made her a 
successful manager were the same characteristics that kept her 
from being selected for partnership.  
The Court clearly recognized gender stereotyping as sex 
discrimination under Title VII.  A plurality concluded that Title 
VII prohibits discrimination, not just because one is a woman, but 
also because one fails to act like a woman.
39
  Because the Court 
emphasized that “we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group,”
40
 many have 
unsuccessfully tried to apply the theory of gender stereotyping to 
transgendered persons.     
 
B. The Road Less Traveled 
 
 In the late seventies and early eighties, trans individuals 
were consistently unsuccessful in their Title VII claims for sex 
discrimination.  Based on the idea that sex refers to anatomy and 
not to how individuals psychologically perceive themselves, 
federal courts decided that trans people do not fall under the 
protection of Title VII.
41
  In 1989 Price Waterhouse
42
gave trans 
persons new hope of Title VII protection when the Court expanded 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (Brennan, J. speaking for Justices 
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun); 258-61 (White, J. concurring); 272-73 
(O'Connor, J. concurring) (accepting plurality's sex-stereotyping analysis). 
40 Id. at 251. 
41 See, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th. Cir. 1977); 
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1982); and 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
42 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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the definition of “sex” under Title VII, holding that sex 
stereotyping provides a cause of action under the statute.
43
 
 Since the Price Waterhouse Court and many other federal 
appellate courts had used the terms “sex” and “gender” 
interchangeably their practice had clouded the issues in many of 
the gender stereotyping cases.
44
  So the federal courts sought to 
clarify the issue by defining “sex” as a noun to distinguish men 
from women, regarding their biological and physiological features.  
As Judge Posner has pointed out, the term “gender” is one 
“borrowed from grammar to designate the sexes as viewed as 
social rather than biological classes.”
45
  Gender will be used in this 
paper to describe cultural attitudes and behaviors such as 
appearance, vocal range, and gestures.   
 A second practice that has clouded the issue has been many 
courts’ tendency to equate effeminacy with homosexuality.  Too 
often it is assumed that masculine men and feminine women are 
heterosexual while feminine men and masculine women are 
homosexual.  These assumptions, sometimes true, sometimes not 
true, are the direct result of gender stereotyping.  When MTF trans 
and effeminate men, most frequently the victims of employment 
discrimination, have complained that they were harassed or denied 
employment benefits because of their gender nonconformity, the 
courts have dismissed the claims saying that homosexuality and 
transsexuality are not protected under Title VII.    
 The courts basically used three reasons to deny recovery 
based on the gender stereotyping theory.  First, many courts 
rejected an effeminacy discrimination claim without even 
                                                 
43 Id. at 250-251. 
44 Jon D. Bible & Patricia Pattison, Similar Cases, Different Results:  The 
Perplexing Question of What Constitutes Title VII “Effeminacy Discrimination, 
11 ALSB J.E.L.L. 22 (2009). 
45 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 24-25 (1992). 
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mentioning Price Waterhouse.46   Their decisions were premised 
on the belief that there is a difference between biological sex and 
gender; gender-based discrimination, which encompasses traits 
such as masculinity, is not proscribed by Title VII.
47
  Second, some 
courts declined to address the stereotyping claims because they had 
not been asserted at the trial, even though the courts expressly 
recognized a Title VII cause of action for discrimination based on 
an employee's failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.
48
  
Third, some courts denied recovery finding that the plaintiffs were 
only using the theory of gender stereotyping to make an “end run” 
around Title VII requirement or to “bootstrap” protection for 
sexual orientation.
49
 
 However, similar to the cases of sexual harassment of 
effeminate men, the theory of sexual stereotyping remained on the 
road less traveled.  For example, in 2007 the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the lower’s court dismissal of a case brought by a MTF 
transsexual, a Utah bus driver who was fired because the company 
feared reprisal from the employee’s use of women’s restrooms.
50
   
                                                 
46 See, Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5876 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 28, 2000); and Klein v. McGowan, 36 F.Supp.2d 885, 887 (D. Minn. 
1999), aff’d, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1999). 
47 Klein at 889,890. 
48 Bibby v. Phil. Coca Cola Bottling Co,, 260 F.3d 257, 259-60 (3d. Cir. 2001); 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d. Cir. 2000); and Higgins v. New Balance 
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st. Cir. 1999). 
49 See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37-39 (2nd Cir. 2000); DiCintio v. 
Westchester Cnty. Med. Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2nd Cir. 1986); Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 231 F.Supp.2d 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Smith v. Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Willingham v. Macon Teleg. Pub. 
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, 453 
F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 
1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003); and Klein v. McGowan, 36 F.Supp.2d 885, 887 (D. 
Minn. 1999), aff’d, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1999).    
50 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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The driver presented two legal theories to support to her claim that, 
in violation of Title VII, she was discriminated against because of 
sex.
51
  First, she argued that transsexualism is sex discrimination, 
protected under Title VII.  Alternatively, she argued that she was 
dismissed because of gender stereotyping, her failure to conform to 
the male sex stereotype.  In response, the court first reiterated that 
transsexuals are not a protected class under Title VII based on the 
traditional definition that it is “unlawful to discriminate against 
women because they are women and men because they are men.”
52
   
The court recognized only “the two starkly defined categories of 
male and female.
53
  Second, the court also rejected her claim of 
gender stereotyping, that she was fired because, as a biological 
male, she failed to conform to stereotypical gender norms.  The 
court acknowledged that the plaintiff established a prima facie case 
of gender stereotyping, but found that in defense the employer had 
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
termination.
54
  The decision to discharge “was based solely on her 
intent to use women’s public restrooms while wearing a UTA 
[Utah Transit Authority] uniform, despite the fact she still had 
male genitalia.”
55
  “However far Price Waterhouse reaches, this 
court cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological 
males to use women's restrooms.”
56
 (Neither the court, nor the 
employer, discussed how the public would know what genitalia 
was under the uniform.) 
 The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to rely on 
Price Waterhouse to uphold a transsexual's claim for protection 
                                                 
51 Id. at 1221. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1222. 
54 Id. at 1224. 
55 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007). 
56 Id. 
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under Title VII.
57
  Smith, a biological male, served as a lieutenant 
in the Fire Department for seven years without any negative 
incidents.
58
  After being diagnosed, in accordance with 
international medical protocols for treating GID [Gender Identity 
Dysphoria], Smith began “expressing a more feminine appearance 
on a full-time basis”.
59
  Smith notified his immediate supervisor 
about his GID diagnosis and treatment, also informing him of the 
likelihood that his treatment would eventually include complete 
physical transformation from male to female.  After learning of the 
GID diagnosis the fire chief, along with the mayor and the city law 
director, determined to use Smith's transsexualism and its 
manifestations as a basis for terminating his employment.  When 
Smith learned of the city officials’ intention, he retained counsel 
and filed a complaint with the EEOC.  Immediately after receiving 
the EEOC’s right to sue letter, the city fired him in retaliation. 
 Implying that his claim was disingenuous, the district court 
stated that Smith merely “invokes the term-of-art created by Price 
Waterhouse, that is, ‘sex-stereotyping,’ as an end run around his 
‘real claim.”
60
  The real claim, the court observed, was “based upon 
his transsexuality”
61
 and “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
based on an individual's transsexualism.”
62
 However, on appeal the 
sixth circuit court reversed and remanded, holding that if 
transsexuals are fired for not conforming to gender stereotypes, 
they have a claim under Title VII; the fact that they are 
transsexuals does not somehow strip them of Price Waterhouse's 
                                                 
57 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
58 Id. at 570. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 571. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
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protection.
63
  The circuit court explained that just as an employer 
who discriminates against women for not wearing dresses or 
makeup is engaging in sex discrimination under the rationale of 
Price Waterhouse, “employers who discriminate against men 
because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex.”
64
  
 Two district courts have followed the lead of the Sixth 
Circuit.  In 2007, the District of Columbia district court held that 
“Title VII is violated when an employer discriminates against any 
employee, transsexual or not, because he or she has failed to act or 
appear sufficiently masculine or feminine enough for an 
employer.”
65
  Dave Schroer applied for a position as a terrorism 
research analyst with the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
presenting himself as a man.  He was offered and accepted the 
position.  When he met with a representative of the CRS to discuss 
the details, he explained that he was under a doctor’s care for 
gender dysphoria and, consistent with the recommended treatment, 
was going to change his name to Diane, begin dressing in 
traditionally feminine attire, and start presenting full-time as a 
woman.
66
  He showed the representative pictures of himself dressed 
in professional female clothing.  In a phone call the next day the 
CRS representative told Schroer that he “would not be a good fit 
given the circumstance that they spoke of yesterday.”
67
  In denying 
the CRA’s motion to dismiss the district court stressed: 
The point here, however, is that Schroer does not 
claim that disclosure of her gender dysphoria was 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 2007). 
66 Id. at 61. 
67 Id.  
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the singular cause of her non-selection. Instead, 
informed by the discovery she has taken, Schroer 
now asserts that she was discriminated against 
because, when presenting herself as a woman, she 
did not conform to Preece's sex stereotypical 
notions about women's appearance and behavior.68 
 
 In a more recent case, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas determined that Lopez's 
transsexuality did not bar her sex stereotyping claim.
69
  The 
defendant medical clinic offered a position to the plaintiff, Izza 
Lopez, a/k/a/ Raul Lopez, but the job offer was subsequently 
rescinded when the clinic's management determined that Lopez 
had “misrepresented” herself as a woman during the interview 
process.
70
 Lopez asserted that River Oaks impermissibly rescinded 
its job offer to her because she failed to conform with traditional 
gender stereotypes.
71
 The court concluded that “applying Title VII 
as written and interpreted by the United States Supreme Court .... 
Lopez has stated a legally viable claim of discrimination as a male 
who failed to conform with traditional male stereotypes.”
72
   
 Based on reasoning identical to that used with Title VII the 
Eleventh Circuit decided a section 1983 case in favor of a MTF 
trans who was fired when her supervisor learned that she would 
begin presenting as a woman.73  She was hired as an editor in the 
Georgia General Assembly's Office of Legislative Counsel when 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 R.Supp.2d 653 
(S.D. Texas 2008). 
70 Id. at 657. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 667-668. 
73 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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presenting as a man.  Glenn claimed sex discrimination in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  The district court granted Glenn's 
motion for summary judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
on appeal.74  The Eleventh Circuit noted that “a person is defined as 
transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her 
behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.”75 
 In 2012 the EEOC clearly recognized that a MTF plaintiff 
had stated a Title VII claim of action.76 The EEOC said that Title 
VII has always protected transgender persons from discrimination 
because of sex.77  Similar to the fact situations in several other 
cases, Macy, a MTF trans, applied for a position in a crime 
laboratory that was part of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) at a time when she was still 
publicly presenting as a man. During phone calls with the Director, 
he told her twice that she would have the position as long as her 
background check did not uncover any problems.  Then Macy 
informed the staffing firm that she was “in the process of 
transitioning from male to female.”78  Shortly after that she was 
notified that the position had been eliminated due to federal budget 
restrictions.  When she investigated further she learned that it was 
not true; the AFT had hired another person.79  Macy thereafter filed 
an EEO complaint alleging that she had been discriminated against 
“on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping, sex due to gender 
transition/change of sex, and sex due to gender identity.”80  Noting 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1315. 
75 Id. at 1315. 
76 Macy v. Holder, EEOC No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 
2012). 
77 Id. at *11. 
78 Id. at *1. 
79 Id. at *1-2. 
80 Id. at *3. 
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that “evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of 
proving sex discrimination” the EEOC also indicated: 
        When an employer discriminates against 
someone because the person is transgender, the 
employer has engaged in disparate treatment 
“related to the sex of the victim.” This is true 
regardless of whether an employer discriminates 
against an employee because the individual has 
expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical 
fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable 
with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in 
the process of transitioning from one gender to 
another, or because the employer simply does not 
like that the person is identifying as a transgender 
person. In each of these circumstances, the 
employer is making a gender-based evaluation, thus 
violating the Supreme Court's admonition [in Price 
Waterhouse] that “an employer may not take gender 
into account in making an employment decision.”81  
 
 
D.  A Summary of the US Situation 
 
 In the previous sections it has been documented that in the 
US, as a legal theory of recovery, gender stereotyping can be 
characterized as the “road less traveled.”  In a variety of cases 
where the theory could have been implemented to allow Title VII 
recovery, it was not.  Either it was not argued, or not allowed, 
based on a number of rationales.  In the remainder of the paper the 
authors will consider a number of perspectives in an attempt to 
                                                 
81 Id. at *7. 
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identify the reasoning that has caused gender stereotyping to be 
widely ignored.  Following Price Waterhouse why does gender 
stereotyping in employment remain an acceptable alternative?  Is 
the answer to be found in the nature of the US federal judiciary, 
our historical, philosophical, and religious culture, or in our social-
psychological attitudes? 
 
IV. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE UK 
 
 The UK situation in relation to transgender discrimination 
is, in one sense far less complex than the US situation. 82 Protection 
from discrimination is included in the Equality Act 2010 which 
prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and 
victimization because of a number of protected characteristics 
including sex, sexual orientation and gender reassignment. 
However, as the Act covers only the protected characteristic of 
gender reassignment, there are likely to be many in the trans 
community who are not able to bring themselves within the narrow 
statutory definition and as such must look for protections 
elsewhere. For this reason and because the Act is relatively recent, 
it is worth exploring the history of protection in this area in order 
to see what protections is available and how it compares with the 
US experience. 
 
                                                 
82 We refer throughout this paper to the UK situation for ease although this is not 
always strictly accurate. Readers will be aware that the UK refers to the United 
Kingdom of England, Wales Scotland and Northern Ireland but that Scotland 
and Northern Ireland operate their own jurisdictions in terms of law and that 
given relatively recent changes in governance there is also an increasing number 
of laws applying only in Wales. It is therefore vital to note the geographic extent 
of the legislation under scrutiny. Most of the relevant legislation referred to in 
this paper applies to Great Britain; that is England, Wales and Scotland. 
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A. The historic context: finding a road to travel 
 
 Prior to the late 1990s there was no protection to speak of 
for trans people living in the UK. In fact the existing legislation 
was often used to justify unfair treatment.83 The Sex 
Discrimination Act (SDA) 197584 required the equal treatment 
between men and women but was held not to include trans people 
because, according to the legislation, the appropriate comparator 
for a woman suffering unequal treatment was a man and vice versa 
meaning that an employer could simply claim that a male to female 
transsexual would be treated in the same (appalling) way as a 
female to male transsexual and there was therefore equal (equally 
unfair, but equal) treatment between the sexes. This view was 
challenged in 1996 with the ruling of the European Court of 
Justice85 in the case of P v S and Cornwall County Council (P v 
S).86 The road toward at least some protections therefore turned out 
to be, and has to a large extent continued to be, a European one. In 
                                                 
83 Stephen Whittle, ‘Employment Discrimination and Transsexual People’, (The 
Gender Identity Research and Education Society, 2000),  available at  
http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/employment-dis-full-paper.pdf (last visited May 
27 2014); and Stephen Whittle, Lewis Turner, and Maryam Al-Alami, 
Engendered Penalties:Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of 
Inequality and Discrimination. (Press for Change, 2007), available at 
http://www.pfc.org.uk/pdf/EngenderedPenalties.pdf (last visited May 27, 2014). 
84 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c.65 (G. Brit.) 
85 For those readers not familiar with the relationship between European Union 
(EU) Law and that of the European Union Member States, it is worth noting that 
EU law takes precedent over National Law and that where questions of EU Law 
arise in any of the national courts (at whatever level) those questions can be 
referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for interpretation. The ECJ is 
therefore not an appeal court in the traditional sense but rather a court of 
interpretation which is to ensure the uniform interpretation of law across the EU. 
86 P v S and Cornwall County Council, ECJ [1996] Industrial Relations Law 
Reports 347. 
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P v S, the claimant was a male to female transsexual working for 
an education establishment. When she informed her employer of 
her intention to undergo gender reassignment  she was dismissed. 
The employer argued that the termination was actually due to 
redundancy but it was held that the real reason was the employer’s 
objection to P undergoing gender reassignment . The case was 
referred to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg because, 
although English Law provided no protection for P, it was thought 
that the European Union Law in this area might.  The Court 
referred to Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions87 and concluded that ‘Article 
5(1) of the Directive precludes dismissal of a transsexual for a 
reason related to a gender reassignment’.88  The Court also took a 
different, and ultimately much fairer approach to the question of 
comparators and instead of asking whether P would have been 
dismissed had she been a female to male transsexual (where the 
answer would have been yes), the court instead asked whether P 
would have been dismissed had she remained a man (where the 
answer would have been no) and therefore saw no reason why 
discrimination on the grounds of sex had not been established.  The 
importance of this decision should not be underestimated. It was 
the first decision in the world offering protection to trans people 
and because it was decided in the European Court of Justice its 
reach went beyond the jurisdiction in which it arose (the UK) and 
                                                 
87 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions OJ L 
39, 14/02/1976, p. 40–42 
88 P v S and Cornwall County Council, ECJ [1996] Industrial Relations Law 
Reports 347. 
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made it unlawful to discriminate in the workplace against those 
intending to undergo, undergoing or having undergone gender 
reassignment in all of the European Union Member States. The 
new interpretation of the SDA was confirmed in ChessingtonWorld 
of Adventures Ltd v Reed,89 where the English Employment 
Appeals Tribunal held that there was no need for a comparator of 
the opposite sex in order to hold that there was discrimination on 
the grounds of sex. The changes were formalised with the 
introduction of the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) 
Regulations 199990 which amended the SDA to include specific 
provision prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender 
reassignment.91 
 Since then there has been little progress in domestic courts 
with research showing that discrimination remains wide spread.
92
 
Croft v Consignia93  serves as a useful example of the UK courts’ 
unwillingness to fully embrace trans equality. The case concerned 
a male to female transsexual Ms. Crofts who wanted to use the 
female toilets at her workplace and was refused by the employer. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that until Ms. Crofts 
was legally a woman, in other words, until she had completed the 
transition and was legally entitled to have her new gender 
recognized in law, the employer was not obliged to allow her to 
use the female facilities. The EAT held that the Health and Safety 
                                                 
89 Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed, EAT [1997] Industrial 
Relations Law Reports 556. 
90 Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 SI 1999/1102. 
91 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c.65 (G. Brit.) §2A. 
92 Whittle, supra note 83. 
93 Croft v Consignia, EAT, [2002] IRLR 851 and Croft v Royal Mail [2003] 
IRLR 592 EWCA Civ 1045 (The change of name is due to the employer 
Consignia changing its name back to Royal Mail, the parties remain the same in 
fact). 
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legislation which obliges employers to provide separate toilet 
facilities for men and women took precedent in this case and that 
Ms. Croft was assigned to a particular set of facilities in the same 
way as her non transsexual colleagues. The Court of Appeal, while 
more sympathetic to Ms. Croft and trans people generally also 
failed to uphold her claim. The Court of Appeal considered section 
82 of the SDA which set out the definition of gender reassignment 
and acknowledged that this included those undergoing gender 
reassignment. It agreed that the long term refusal to allow the use 
of toilet facilities for the ‘new’ gender would be discriminatory but 
that there was no automatic entitlement to use the toilet facilities of 
the new sex immediately from the employee informing the 
employer of their intention. Instead the employer should allow the 
use of the facilities based on a case by case consideration of the 
workplace context including having regard to other employees and 
the transsexual employee’s circumstances including the stage in 
the medical proceedings and the employee’s own assessment and 
presentation. In Ms. Croft’s case, so the Court, the time had not yet 
come for her to be entitled to use the female toilet facilities. 
 The decision in Croft was disappointing but there were 
others which showed more promise.  In A v Chief Constable of the 
West Yorkshire Police94 the Court of Appeal held that a post-
operative transsexual had the right to be treated as female in all 
aspects and the Police could not invoke a ‘genuine occupational 
requirement’ defense95 to less favorable treatment when refusing 
A’s application to become a Constable on the grounds that she 
would not be able to conduct intimate searches of women. In 
Richards v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ECJ96 and 
                                                 
94 A v Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police, CA [2003] IRLR 32. 
95 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c.65 (G. Brit.) §7A. 
96 Richards v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Case C-423/04) ECJ 
2006 I-03585. 
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Grant v The United Kingdom ECtHR97 Europe once again led the 
way forcing the UK to take another step towards trans equality. In 
Richards the ECJ concluded that Ms. Richards who had been 
living as woman permanently was entitled to a state pension 
payable to women at 60 rather than having to wait until reaching 
the age of 65 at which men became entitled to a state pension. This 
was irrespective of whether Ms. Richards had a Gender 
Recognition Certificate or not, the deciding factor was simply 
whether or not she had been permanently living as a woman. In 
Grant the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg98 came 
to exactly the same conclusion stating that not allowing Ms. Grant 
to take her pension at age 60 was a breach of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 Some progress has therefore been made and a path to be 
taken shaped by European Union Law and European Human 
Rights Instruments. It is now up to the UK to travel that path, 
widen it and make it more inclusive. 
 
B.  The Statutory Framework: Providing a roadmap 
 
 The Equality Act 2010 came into force in October 2010 
and aims to consolidate all the previously existing anti-
discrimination legislation in Great Britain. It covers a series of 
                                                 
97 Grant v The United Kingdom (Application No. 32570/03) ECtHR [2006] All 
ER (D) 337. 
98 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an institution separate from 
the European Union and should not be confused with the European Court of 
Justice. The ECtHR hears cases arising from infringements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to which the UK is a signatory. In order to bring a 
case to the ECtHR, all national avenues for seeking redress must have been 
exhausted. The ECtHR therefore functions more like an appeal court in the 
traditional sense 
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‘protected characteristics’ which, for the purposes of this paper 
importantly, includes gender reassignment. Section 7 confirms that 
a person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment 
when that person “is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has 
undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of 
reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other 
attributes of sex.”99  The Act prohibits four distinct forms of 
behavior by employers. The first is direct discrimination defined as 
treating someone less favorably because of a protected 
characteristic; the second is indirect discrimination which is the 
application of a provision, criterion or practice which has a 
disproportionate negative impact on someone because of a 
protected characteristic, thirdly, harassment which is the engaging 
in behavior which has the purpose or effect of creating a hostile or 
degrading environment and finally victimization which is the less 
favorable treatment of someone because they assert their rights 
under the provisions laid down in the Equality Act. 
 Although the Equality Act 2010 contains provisions which 
reach beyond the employment sphere, the discussion in this paper 
is limited to employment. Nonetheless it is worth noting that 
protection from discrimination begins at the hiring process and 
applies to hiring, the offering of terms and conditions, the actual 
terms and conditions and access to promotions, benefits and other 
perks as well as to disciplinary actions and dismissal. The Act 
covers those in regular employment relationships as well as those 
classed as contractors or temporary workers and makes special 
provisions for partnerships as well as personal and public office 
holders (where these are not elected). 
 The statutory framework therefore appears, at first glance 
at least, comprehensive and should ensure that those who have or 
                                                 
99 Equality Act, 2010 c15 (Gr. Brit.) s7 (1). 
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who are planning to undergo gender reassignment will be protected 
from discrimination in the work place. The Equality Act has also 
removed the requirement of medical supervision which was 
included in the SDA. This change is to be welcomed as it is likely 
to increase the number of people able to access protection as there 
is no longer a requirement to intend to or be undergoing medical 
treatment – the focus is now on the gender as which the person 
intends to or is living permanently and the Explanatory Notes of 
the Act make it quite clear that gender reassignment is to be 
understood as a process and not as a medical procedure. 
 However there are also some worrying provisions in the 
Equality Act 2010. These relate mostly to the exceptions to the 
provisions providing for non-discrimination in the provision of 
services contained in Schedule 3. However, there are also 
exceptions relating to work. These exceptions are set out in 
Schedule 9 and provide that where there is an occupational 
requirement to have a particular protected characteristic, such as 
gender, there is no discrimination if someone of a different gender 
is treated less favorably. The occupational requirement must, 
however, be proportionate. Schedule 9, Part 1 Section 1 (3)(a) 
states that the references in sub-paragraph (1) to a requirement to 
have a protected characteristic are to be read— (a)in the case of 
gender reassignment, as references to a requirement not to be a 
transsexual person (and section 7(3) is accordingly to be 
ignored);100 This provision is hugely problematic and the 
explanatory notes fail to fully encapsulate the issues arising. The 
explanatory notes give the following example: 
A counsellor working with victims of rape might 
have to be a woman and not a transsexual person, 
                                                 
100 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (Gr. Brit.) Schedule 9.  
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even if she has a Gender Recognition Certificate, in 
order to avoid causing them further distress.101 
 
 There are several issues here. The first is that it 
seems to endorse a distinction between woman and 
transsexual person with or without a Gender Recognition 
Certificate whereas the point of the GRC was to allow a 
person to legally and completely become their ‘new’ 
gender. The provision appears to make a GRC rather 
pointless if discrimination is allowed even where one has 
been granted. The second problem is that the employer of 
the counsellor would have no way of knowing whether the 
person applying for the job is transsexual. If the employee 
presents herself as a woman and the employer has no 
reason to think she is a transsexual, the fact that she was not 
in fact born a woman is surely irrelevant and there is no 
reason to think she could not be an effective counsellor or 
that a victim of rape would feel uncomfortable with her. 
The example given, which may shape how employers 
implement the provisions, seems to be based on a 
stereotyped assumption of what a woman and a rape 
counsellor should be and what they should look like. It 
seems there is significant scope here for employers to 
(deliberately or not) discriminate against a large proportion 
of the LGBT community based on appearance. A third 
issue is that the example makes presumptions about what 
the victims of rape might feel or think about counsellors 
and those presumptions are based on a very narrow view. It 
ignores sexual violence against men and importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, against trans victims. It ignores the 
                                                 
101 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (Gr. Brit.) Explanatory Notes. 
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fact that the Act would not require those offering 
counselling to the trans community to themselves be trans 
and it presumes that female rape victims would not want a 
male counsellor. It’s a badly conceived example but one 
that has the potential for significant impact as employers 
look to the explanatory notes to help them shape their own 
policy and guidance. 
While the Equality Act has broadened the path to be 
taken to include a more nuanced and less medical 
understanding of gender reassignment it has not taken us 
further down the path to equality and has in some important 
respects opened up the possibility of backward steps when 
it should have been leading us forward. 
 
C. Reading the Roadmap - Interpreting Statute: Recent Case Law 
 
 The question now is the extent to which the courts will 
interpret the provisions in the Equality Act 2010 in a way which 
advances equality. There is of course the possibility of expansive 
interpretation of the provision prohibiting discrimination and very 
narrow and strict interpretation of the exceptions. There is also 
however the potential for the opposite to happen. There have been 
few cases since the Act came into force in October 2010 and 
results are mixed.  
 In early 2014, Ms. Chapman, a police Constable and male 
to female post-operative transsexual complained to an 
Employment Tribunal that she had been discriminated against 
because she was a transsexual because she had effectively been 
forced to out herself as such over the police radio.102 The control 
                                                 
102 Chapman v Essex Police, ET, 2014 unreported, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/transsexual-pcs-
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room did not believe who she was and claimed she had ‘a male 
voice’. Ms. Chapman reported the incident but the police force 
refused to carry out a full investigation or deal with the matter. 
Two further incidents followed leaving Ms. Chapman extremely 
distressed. Her claim was however rejected and her reaction to 
being challenged over her identity when using the radio was 
described as extreme. The police force on the other hand was 
praised for having introduced trans awareness training 6 months 
prior to the hearing. A more positive approach was taken in a case 
relating to service provision and the use of toilet facilities by 
customers.103 Ms. Brooks, a male to female transsexual sued a pub 
after being refused entry to the ladies toilets and then being barred 
when she complained. Her complaint was upheld and she was 
awarded compensation. 
 
D. Summary of the UK position 
 
 The UK position looks in good shape. We have a clear 
roadmap in the form of statutory provisions which prohibit the 
discrimination because of gender reassignment. However, we have 
not yet learned to take the direct path shown to us by the map. The 
map seems to have flaws,  roads not fully marked out and some 
falsely labelled as heading towards equality when in fact they take 
us a step backwards. What we now need is a brave judiciary 
willing to take the most direct path towards equality, a judiciary 
which will interpret concepts broadly and inclusively and 
                                                                                                             
discrimination-case-against-essex-police-rejected-9009093.html (last visited 
May 27 2014). 
103 Kirklees Law Centre v New Inn, ET, 2014, unreported, available at 
http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/policy/news/news/kirklees-law-centre-wins-
landmark-transgender-discrimination-case (last visited May 27 2014). 
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exceptions narrowly so as to afford the most protection to the most 
members of the trans community. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Review and Comparison 
  
 America, the Land of the Free, does not appear to be ready 
to extend human rights protections to its trans citizens.  This is in 
stark contrast to other developed countries in Europe.  The United 
Kingdom has already legislated to provide trans individuals with a 
system to clearly identify themselves with their appropriate gender.  
For nearly fifteen years the UK has protected trans from 
discrimination in employment and in other aspects of their daily 
lives.  Meanwhile, back in the US, only a handful of courts have 
recognized that trans people are protected under Title VII.  It has 
only been in the last year that the EEOC recognized the coverage.  
For decades LGBT individuals have sought to be protected by 
ENDA, but Congress has continued to reject their appeals.   
 In past generations the United States has prided itself on 
being in the forefront of social and progressive change.  Has it now 
stalled and failed to recognize any but the “typical” American, the 
rugged individual who tamed the West by brute force?  Recent 
surveys have indicated that approximately 75 percent of Americans 
support workplace protection for LGBT, but they believe that the 
protection has already been provided under federal law. 
 Why do Americans, as compared to the British and 
Europeans, remain more attached to rigid gender stereotypes?  Is it 
because as a younger country we are still adolescent in our 
thinking?  As a society are we too fearful to honor and respect 
individual differences?  Is the aversion to trans individuals based in 
religion?  Do people in the US take religion more seriously than 
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those in the UK and Europe?  Why are gays and lesbians becoming 
more accepted in the US, but trans persons are still reviled?   
 
B. Transgender Fear and Hate 
 
 There is evidence that indicates that trans individuals are 
the objects of significant revulsion, particularly in the US.  
Previously in the paper, statistics were presented that shows that 
they are six times more likely to be murdered than gays and 
lesbians.  Why are the majority of Americans now willing to give 
gays and lesbians full protection from discrimination, but continue 
to reject trans people?  Over the years Congress has come close to 
passing ENDA when only LGB were included, but refused to even 
bring a bill to the floor when it included transgenders.  This section 
of the paper is designed to contemplate and speculate on the 
reasons for the extreme revulsion.   
 In a posting on the Internet one man passionately answered 
the question, “Why do so many people hate transgender people?” 
The reason people hate transgender is very simple. 
Every human being has something I call "basic 
identity features" these are things like: gender, 
ethnicity or also / and religion also a few more, 
depending on culture and society. Now because the 
gender is one of the most basic, basic identities 
everybody need [sic] to definitely identify 
themselves in these terms. Now, if you come along 
with your [sic] as you say: "transgender" - Identity 
everyone will of course want to be as far distanced 
from you in terms of features. All women who have 
similarities with you, will feel threatened. Because 
they want to be as feminine as possible. But when 
they spot features, which you and them have in 
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common, they feel automatically threatened because 
it seems as if they’re [sic] basic identity is not so 
sure anymore, what follows is, that they start 
thinking about themselves and if they're enough 
feminine etc. etc. same in men. It's absolutely down 
to the psychic core of Darwinism. And I feel the 
same. I'm male and I drastically hate transgender 
people. Because sometimes I have the impression a 
[sic] have certain similarities with them, but I want 
to be as masculine as possible. This complete [sic] 
makes me hate all those people !104 
 
It appears that his opinion is based on the fear that a WTM trans 
may appear to be more masculine than he is.   
 Fear is the most common emotion discussed in most of the 
postings.  Another individual posted, “I think because of the two 
basic fears people tend to avoid addressing: fear of the unknown 
and fear of change. Transgender people encompass both.”105  One 
insightful person succinctly stated, “People tend to fear what they 
don't understand.”106  Several posts on the blog offered thoughtful 
and compassionate comments. 
People hate transgender people because we live in a 
society that shuns differences. Difference has 
become almost shameful because of our cultural 
obsession with conformity and belonging. People 
                                                 
104 Experience Project, Why do so many people hate transgender people?, 
available at http://www.experienceproject.com/question-answer/Why-Do-So-
Many-People-Hate-Transgender-People-We-Dont-You-You-:c/1827020 (last 
visited May 28, 2014). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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are uncomfortable with others who do not share 
their same ideals.107 
It is also due to lack of empathy. I cannot imagine 
how trapped and confused and isolated I would feel 
if I was not comfortable with being a woman. I 
think they are very strong people to be able to 
overcome the fear of being an outcast or not 
accepted to pursue the life they feel is meant for 
them.108 
 
In response to the comment on empathy, another person observed, 
“You are right. If you are able to mentally dehumanize someone, 
you can do anything to them and maintain a clear conscience.”109 
 Where did the members of our society learn to fear, hate 
and dehumanize trans people?  One author postulates that we 
learned it at the movies.110  He cited movies such as Ace Ventura:  
Pet Detective, Naked Gun 33 1/3, and The Hangover.  In all three 
movies MTF trans individuals tricked male characters into having 
a sexual experience with them.  In Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective, the 
male victim, played by Jim Carey, only “made out” (didn’t have 
intercourse) with the trans female.  However, “the memory of 
kissing a transgender woman was forcing Carey to puke profusely, 
burn his clothes, and weep.”111  How many millions of people 
learned a nasty, but unforgettable, lesson from that scene?  The 
author summarizes: 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Cord Jefferson, How I Learned to Hate Transgender People, GOOD 
MAGAZINE, (June 30, 2011) available at http://magazine.good.is/articles/how-i-
learned-to-hate-transgender-people (last visited May 28, 2014). 
111 Id. 
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Repugnance is a common theme in the trans-
people-as-jokes canon. But more prevalent is the 
element of deceit. Time and again in both comedic 
and dramatic films, transgender people are cast as 
deviant tricksters out to fool innocent victims into 
sleeping with them. This narrative plays upon two 
of America's deepest fears: sexual vulnerability and 
humiliation. Not only is your sex partner "lying" 
about their gender, victims who "fall for it" are then 
forced to grapple with the embarrassment of being 
had, of being seen as gay. Men "tricked" into 
sleeping with another man are embarrassed by the 
threat to their masculinity. So much culture has 
taught us that transgender people aren't just sexual 
aliens, they're also predatory liars.112 
 
  But there is hope.  At a web site called CafeMom, one of 
the participants confessed that “I secretly hate transgender 
people.”113  But she concluded her comments with, “I've decided in 
order to fully accept transgender people, I need to fully understand 
them and their life struggles. How I feel sickens me and I cannot 
believe I really feel this way.”114  
 These remarks only reflect antidotal evidence, thoughts, 
values, and experiences of individuals who were interested enough 
in the topic to offer their comments.  Of course, there is no way to 
prove the real reasons that so many people have an aversion to, and 
inclination to discriminate against trans individuals.  However 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 I secretly hate transgender people, CafeMom, available at 
http://www.cafemom.com/group/115189/forums/read/16409668/I_secretly_hate
_transgende (last visited May 28, 2014). 
114 Id. 
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some legal scholars have conducted research and contributed their 
expert opinions. 
 This concept of male preference was presented and 
discussed in depth in a 1995 Yale Law Journal article.  Professor 
Mary Anne C. Case asserts that the societal devaluation and 
general disdain for women and feministic characteristics are the 
basis for discrimination against men who want to experience and 
value their feminine qualities.115     
 The man who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly 
despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities 
and for descending from his masculine gender 
privilege to do so. The masculine woman is today 
more readily accepted. Wanting to be masculine is 
understandable; it can be a step up for a woman, 
and the qualities associated with masculinity are 
also associated with success.116 
 
In her article Professor Case was only considering discrimination 
against effeminate men.  If they are “doubly despised” it is difficult 
to imagine the level of repugnance that may be experienced by 
MTF trans.   
 By focusing on the reasons why the societal margins, 
effeminate men and trans individuals, are disliked and feared, it is 
possible to recognize that the base fear may be of feminine 
influence.    
In arguing that the treatment of the exceptional 
effeminate man teaches us much about that of both 
feminine and masculine women as well as 
                                                 
115 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1995). 
116 Id. at 2. 
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masculine men, I hope to have shown how, once 
again, the margins can illuminate the center; and to 
have taken steps to make the world safe for us all, 
norms and exceptions, men and women, masculine 
and feminine, and every shade in between.117     
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
When you know better, you do better.118 
 
 Throughout this paper we have outlined the systematic 
discrimination faced by trans people in employment and in their 
lives generally in both the US and the UK and we have speculated 
on why discrimination is so wide-spread and why legislators and 
courts are reluctant to extend protection to the trans community in 
any meaningful way. It seems clear to us that law alone can 
achieve very little here. Even in the UK where legislation does 
exist, discrimination is still common. What is required is a change 
in culture and attitude. A better understanding of trans people in 
their lives and struggles, greater visibility and role models, and 
positive media portrayal would all help. In addition, as we have 
suggested above, as long as women are not fully seen as equal, it is 
unlikely that male to female transsexuals will be considered as 
equals as they will be assumed to have deliberately assumed the 
weaker sex. Both countries have a long way to go to change 
attitudes but arguably the UK, less constrained perhaps by the 
religious right, has walked a little further down the long road to 
equality. Having said that changes in attitude are needed, we do 
                                                 
117 Id. at 104. 
118 Maya Angelou, available at http://www.eonline.com/news/546030/maya-
angelou-s-15-best-quotes-regarding-love-forgiveness-humility-and-survival (last 
visited May 29). 2014) 
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believe that law has a role to play to send clear signals about what 
is and is not acceptable within society. In concluding this paper we 
therefore want to outline what it is we think the US and UK can 
learn from each other. 
 
A.  What the US can learn from the UK 
 
 The UK has taken one very big step towards equality 
through legislation. The US has not and, as we have contended 
above, the law in the US is not clear and seems to be decided on a 
case by case basis. While legislation, or at least case law, that 
categorically brings trans people within the remit of existing legal 
provisions, might not immediately reduce levels of discrimination, 
doing nothing allows people to keep believing and perpetuating 
their stereotypes. Legislation which affords protection to trans 
people forces those who discriminate and those who hate to 
examine those prejudices. Some will do so before they 
discriminate, others may only get there after having been sued. 
Legislation will generate cases; cases will generate media coverage 
which will in turn generate discussion which will, it is hoped, lead 
to better understanding and less discrimination. The symbolic 
power of law is what is important rather than the exact provisions 
themselves.  
An approach which is based on prohibiting direct 
discrimination and indirect discrimination captures the most 
obvious discrimination directed at trans individuals because they 
are trans but would also cover more subtle and sometimes 
unintentional discrimination. In fact a broad interpretation of 
indirect discrimination could cover situations of gender 
stereotyping on the basis that applying gender norms has a 
disproportionate negative impact on trans individuals. The 
opportunity for the US is to take an approach and to interpret it 
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more broadly and more inclusively than it so far has been in the 
UK. The US could also do well to consider the possibility of 
explicit protection from harassment and not just discrimination in 
order to try and reduce the amount of bullying and harassment 
faced by trans people in the workplace and further afield. 
 
B.  What the UK can learn from the US 
 
 It should be obvious from the discussions above that we 
believe that the US has further to travel on the road to equality than 
the UK does. For a start the UK has, in statute, recognized that 
those who intend to, are undergoing or have undergone gender 
reassignment are deserving of protection. However, that is not to 
say that the UK cannot learn anything from the US. There are 
many who identify as trans without intending to undergo gender 
reassignment and there is no real protection for them in the UK. It 
is here where the concept of gender stereotyping might be usefully 
employed to gain some protections. This of course would only 
work if the gender stereotyping provisions are interpreted so as to 
cover the trans community and this seems to be a rather big if. For 
example, the law on dress codes and grooming standards in the UK 
has held fast to a ‘difference is acceptable as long as standards are 
comparable in approach119 and cases such as Schmidt120 and 
                                                 
119 Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd [1977] IRLR 360 EAT. 
120 Id. (In this case the question arose of whether particular dress codes were 
more restrictive for men than for women. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
concluded that as long as general standards were laid down difference in detail 
of clothing permitted was not likely to be discriminatory. Schmidt has been 
doubted but not explicitly overruled). 
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Smith121 remain good law.  Certain stereotyped assumptions 
therefore persist.  
 In relation to transvestites who may wish to dress in 
clothing usually associated with the opposite sex while at work, 
current case law holds out little hope. The case of Kara  v  London  
Borough  of  Hackney122 shows that neither the UK, nor Europe are 
quite ready to step boldly toward equality. A male transvestite was, 
according to the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal not 
discriminated against when banned from wearing women’s clothes 
and, according to the ECtHR, his Convention rights were also not 
breached. Although the ban on him wearing women’s clothing was 
an interference with his private life, the ban was found to be in 
accordance with the law and ‘necessary in a democratic society. In 
other words, the public image of the company and the concern 
about co-workers was more important than equality for Kara and 
other trans people.  
There is another, subtly but importantly different, way of 
looking at these cases: If we say Kara was discriminated against 
because she is a transvestite, there is no protection in law. If we 
however frame the situations as Kara was discriminated against 
because she did not conform to the expectations of men in the 
workplace, we have discrimination because of gender. The 
problem is that the same arguments that can be made here were 
made in relation to transgender people before the SDA was 
amended: A female (the appropriate comparator in this case) who 
dresses in male clothing would also be banned from doing so. Both 
                                                 
121 Smith v Safeway plc [1996] IRLR 456 CA  (in which a man was held not to 
have been treated less favorably because the uniform policy required men to 
have hair that was shorter than shoulder length whereas women’s hair could be 
longer as long as it was pinned back at work). 
122 Kara v London Borough of Hackney (1996). 
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sexes are therefore treated equally (badly). It seems therefore this 
road may be blocked. 
 However, the law does show some promise for exploring 
the idea of stereotyping. There are examples where stereotyping 
has clearly been held to be unlawful such as in cases where 
presumptions were made about women’s roles and the importance 
of their jobs vis-à-vis their husband’s.123 Even more promising is 
the law in relation to sexual orientation and, in fact gender 
reassignment which states that discrimination is also unlawful 
where someone believes a person to have a protected 
characteristic. A useful example of this is the case of Thomas v 
Sanderson Blinds124 where the claimant was teased and bullied for 
being homosexual when in fact the perpetrators knew that he was 
not gay (and he knew that they knew). It was simply that he had 
gone to a boarding school in a town known to be gay friendly and 
that he displayed certain mannerisms considered to be 
stereotypically gay. If stereotypical assumptions or perceived 
possession of a protected characteristic might give rise to 
protection this can be used in some cases to protect some in the 
trans community and it may in time be developed to further so as 
to offer even greater protection. We should, surely be working 
towards a model of equality which allows all to express their 
                                                 
123 See for example Coleman v Skyrail Oceanic ([1981] IRLR 398 in which the 
woman was dismissed when she married her husband who worked for a rival 
travel firm. The firms were concerned about confidential information being 
leaked and assumed that the man was the breadwinner and therefore the woman 
should be dismissed by her firm. Also see Horsey v Dyfed County Council 
[1982] IRLR 395 where it was assumed that the female employee would leave 
the company and follow her husband who had got a job in another city. On that 
basis she was refused training because she was unlikely to return to work for 
long after the training course. 
124 English v Thomas Sanderson Blinds (2009) 
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identity in the way that they want without imposing our 
expectations of how men and women should dress, talk and 
behave. 
 
